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Summary 
Management of many Nepalese forests has been devolved to local communities. 
Forest products, which are used by the community and which may also be traded, are 
essential contributors to community well-being. Forests are also important 
contributors of ecosystem services, such as flood protection and wildlife habitat. 
Nepalese communities were surveyed to measure flows of forest products from their 
community forests. A stochastic frontier analysis shows that communities are not 
producing forest products efficiently and there is potential for improvement. The 
results shows that forest products benefit and environmental performance are 
associated products. In addition, analysis reveals that factors such as social capital, 
support from government and knowledge in management contributes positively to
the production efficiency. It is anticipated that these findings will contribute to 
community forest policy redesign and consequently to the welfare of communities.  
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1. Introduction
Management of many Nepalese forests has been handed over to local communities
who have been entrusted to supply forest products and to address local 
environmental problems. Communities produce a range of forest products such as 
timber, fuel-wood, fodder and grasses from their Community Forests (CF) as well as 
ecosystem services, such as soil protection and wildlife conservation (Thoms, 2008).
There is limited information on the environmental or community welfare effects of 
entrusting communities to manage forests. There is some evidence at the household 
level (Adhikari, 2005; Malla, 2000; Thoms, 2008) that CFs increase income 
disparities within communities. Chakraborty (2001) and Iversen et al. (2006) have 
analysed institutional and economic stability effects of CFs at the community level.
Several studies have indicated improvement in forest condition with community
forestry. For example, Gautam et al. (2004b), found significant improvement in CF 
forest cover over the 25 years from 1976. Likewise, Gilmour et al. (2004) identified
improvements in soil erosion control and water conservation in areas where 
communities have been able to regenerate forest cover in previously degraded land. 
However, these studies have taken into account only the biophysical aspects of the 
forest; they have ignored forest products. Studies undertaken so far have dealt only 
with consumption of forest products at the household level and have provided limited 
information on changes in environmental conditions. The relationship between 
community welfare from consumption of forest products and the condition of the 
natural environment in CFs has not been addressed.
2. Study Objectives 
This research analyses the production performance of CF in terms of forest products 
benefits at the community level and investigates the relationship between forest 
production and various social, economic and environmental factors. The objectives 
of this study are; 
o To identify production efficiency of CF by examining the relationship between 
ecosystem and community outcomes for CFs and,
o To investigate factors that influence production efficiency.
3. Community Forest Management in Nepal 
Nepal forest resources have always had an important place in sustaining rural 
livelihoods. More than 80% of the population relies on forest products, such as fuel 
wood for cooking and heating and fodder and litter for livestock production (Thoms, 
2008). Recognising the increasing depletion of forest resources and the Department 
of Forests’ limited capacity to handle the problem alone, in 1978 the government 
introduced CF policy to seek local communities’ cooperation in sustainable 
management and use of forest resources (Gautam et al., 2004a). The Forest Act 1993 
and the Forest Regulation 1995 have guaranteed local communities rights to use 
forest resources. The CF management approach is one of the most cited success
stories for managing common property resources (Adhikari, 2005; Chakraborty, 
2001; Chaudhary, 2000). The Nepalese government intends to hand over all 
accessible forest to local communities for sustainable management and utilisation 
(Thoms, 2008).  
Under CF management, parts of national forests are given to the local community, 
which is vested rights of access, use, exclusion and management of forest resources
(Thoms, 2008). Each forest user group (FUG) prepares its own constitution for day-
to-day group functioning, and a forest operational plan. The forest operational plan 
and the constitution are legal documents mutually agreed between the local 
community and the government. FUGs undertake development and forest 
management activities based on the provisions in these two documents. Up until 
2009 more than 14,000 forest patches, about 22 % of Nepal’s total forest area, had
been entrusted to communities. Approximately 1.67 million households, about 35 % 
of the total population, have been involved in CF (Sharma, 2009). 
4. Factors Influencing CF Production 
Generally, in neo-classical production analysis the role of the agency which is 
responsible for production has been ignored. As a result, only transformation factors 
have been analysed, ignoring transaction factors. However, institutional economists 
such as North (1990) have demonstrated the role of the agency in the production 
process. North claimed that transformation factors, such as land, labour and capital, 
and transaction factors, which are related to social, economic and cultural aspects of 
the agency, are equally important. Similarly, Misra & Kant (2004)  have 
demonstrated  the significant role of social and economic factors related to agency in 
the production process of joint forest management in India.
Some studies have also documented the influence of group size, access to market and 
forest dependency on collective action in community-based management (Agrawal, 
2001b; Agrawal & Chhatre, 2006; Gebremedhin et al., 2003). Agrawal (2000), in a 
study of community forestry in northern India, reported that forest condition was 
better in communities with larger numbers of households than in communities with 
small numbers of households. Similarly, Heltberg (2001) observed better collective 
action in large groups than in small groups. However, these outcomes are not 
consistent with collective action theory, which claims that the likelihood of collective 
action is higher in small user groups (Poteete & Ostrom, 2004).
Wade (1987) claimed that scarcity of resources encourages people to form groups to 
achieve intense needs, which would not be achievable by individual action. In 
contrast to earlier findings and claims, Bardhan (1993) has argued that medium 
levels of scarcity favour collective action. He argues that, at high levels of scarcity, 
people struggle for survival and the breaking of resource use rules is likely. At low 
levels of scarcity people get adequate access to resources, so they are reluctant to 
participate in collective resource management activities. 
Many studies have demonstrated the influence of market access on CF management,
but its role is widely contested. Some researchers (such as Agrawal, 2001a; 
Gebremedhin et al., 2003) have argued that better market access increases the value 
of resources, and thus produces an incentive for CF groups to heavily exploit the 
forest. Other researchers (such as Baland & Platteau, 1996; Pender & Scherr, 1999)
have claimed that access to markets may lessen the contribution of group members to 
resource management since community members are less reliant on forest. Thus, the 
effect of market access on common resource management is ambiguous and site 
specific. 
5. Framework for Analysis
Welfare of each individual community depends on the amount of utility that 
community derives from forest products and ecosystem services. The community 
produces various kinds of forest products by using input factors. According to
Bergson (1938), a welfare model for the individual community may be written as; 
Wi = F(Y,X) (1)
Y = g(X, θ) (2)
Y is a vector of forest products an individual community consumes and X is an input 
vector, θ is other factors. Forest products include both direct consumable products 
such as timber, fodder and fuel wood and indirect products, such as soil and water 
conservation services. The production function is (2). Individual FUGs choose the 
vector of inputs for their CF, which determines Y through the production function,
and hence community welfare. Some combinations of inputs will be less efficient 
than others, resulting in outputs Y that are not on the production possibilities frontier.  
This study seeks to identify that production possibility frontier and factors that may 
affect FUGs’ abilities to reach the frontier.
6. Analytical Models
It was assumed that forest product benefits and environmental performance have a 
trade off relationship. Therefore, the production possibility frontier (PPF) model 
shown in figure 1 was assumed to exist. This model helps to explain the relationship 
between  two outputs, by representing the different combination of outputs that can 
be produced with a given level of inputs (McCoy, 2003). Production (in)efficiency is 
measured by the deviation from the PPF. 
Figure 1. Production possibility frontier for two outputs 
Data envelopment methods (DEA) and stochastic output distance models are used to 
estimate the PPF in multiple outputs cases. DEA does not require any assumption 
about specific functional form (Cooper et al., 2006; Forsund et al., 1980) and can 
handle multiple inputs and outputs together (Ondrich & Ruggiero, 2001). However, 
DEA methods are criticised for various reasons. First, DEA measures efficiency 
relative to other producers. Hence, by adding an extra producer into the analysis the 
efficiency scores may change, especially if the added producer lies along the frontier. 
Second, efficiency scores calculated using DEA are sensitive to outliers (Nyshadham 
& Rao, 2000; Simar, 2007). Third, DEA methods assume that the entire deviation of 
a producer from the production frontier is because of inefficiency (Coelli, 1995; 
Latruffe et al., 2005). This assumption has enormous implications in efficiency 
calculation. 
Estimation of PPF by using stochastic output distance functions depends on the 
relationship between outputs.  For example, the Cobb-Dougals functional form is not 
appropriate, since it has different curvature (Kumbhakar &Knox Lovell, 2000). An
alternative to stochastic output distance functions, in a single output PPF model 
shown in the Figure 2, which is used in this study to analyse production efficiency. 
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Figure 2. The production possibility frontier model for one output 
Curve OD represents the PPF, which envelops all the possible productions for 
varying levels of the inputs. Production efficiency is measured relative to OD. 
Efficient units are those operating on the production frontier (e.g. B), while 
inefficient ones are below the production frontier.
Two groups of methods have been used for estimating the production possibility 
frontier, thereby measuring efficiency; deterministic methods, such as (DEA), and 
the stochastic frontier method. Because of the various criticism of the DEA method, 
the stochastic frontier model (SFM) is preferred. The SFM assumes that outputs (and
their deviations from the PPF) are a function of inputs, inefficiency and random error. 
In the SFM inefficiency is identified with a disturbance term in the production 
function (Greene, 1993). A general stochastic production function with single output 
is given by;
( ; ) . e x p ( )i i iY f x   ,                                            (3)
i i iv u   .
Where Yi denotes output, xi denotes a set of inputs,  is set of parameters to be 
estimated and i denotes individual producers. εi is a composed error term assumed to 
consist of two elements, vi and ui . vi is random error and ui is a non negative variable 
that accounts for technical inefficiency.
6.1 Functional Form for Stochastic Frontier Analysis 
Several studies have used the translog (TL) functional form to estimate the PPF 
(Bigsby, 1994; Lien et al., 2007; Parikh et al., 1995). The TL functional form is 
flexible, without prior restrictions on elasticities of substitution or returns to scale 
(Bigsby, 1994; Coelli, 1995). However, there is a risk of multicollinearity when the 
number of parameters to be estimated is large and numbers of observations are few 
(Siry & Newman, 2001). The Cobb Douglas (CD) functional form is more 
appropriate in that situation. Since this study involves eight inputs and sample size is 
relatively small, the CD functional form was used to estimate the PPF. 
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There were two outputs of concern – forest products and environmental quality. The 
SFM does not allow both to be dependent variables, so forest products were used and 
environmental condition was treated as an independent variable1. A CD production 
function of the following form was used;  
j 0lnY lni ij jX     (4)
Y
j
denotes the direct benefits per hectare from CF, β0 is an intercept, βj are 
parameters to be estimated, Xij is input i, with one of the Xis being environmental 
quality, and εj is a composed error term defined as; 
i i iv u   (5)
vi represents random error and ui accounts for technical inefficiency. vi is assumed to 
have a symmetric normal distribution [vi ~N (0, σu2)], whereas ui is assumed to have 
a non-negative half normal distribution with |N (0, σu2)|. 
Since vi and ui follow two different distributions, (vi-ui) is asymmetrically distributed 
and negatively skewed. Following Jondrow et al.(1982), maximum likelihood 
estimation of equation (4) yields consistent estimators for β, λ and σ2, λ=σu/σv and 
σ2=σ2u + σ2v. 
Efficiency of CFi is the conditional mean of ui for given εi , as defined by equation 
(6):
ˆiu = *
( / )
( | )
1 ( / )i i
f
E u
F
      
         
,  (6)
where f (.) and F (.) represent the standard normal density function and cumulative 
normal density function respectively, and σ* = σuσv/σ . Once estimates of ui are 
obtained from equation (6), estimates of efficiency of each CF can be calculated 
using equation (7);  
             ˆexp( )i iTE u  , (7) 
6.2 Model to Explain Production Efficiency 
This study not only aimed at ranking CFs according to efficiency, but also to explain 
factors influencing the ranking using an econometric model. An ordered logit model
was used for this purpose because CFs were grouped into three classes based on 
estimated efficiencies (Lu, 1999). 
6.3 Analytic Network Process 
The Analytic Network Process (ANP) was used to calculate the environmental 
performance of individual CFs. The ANP is a mathematical method based on the 
theory of ratio scale measurement (Herath, 2004), in which a mathematical technique 
is used to obtain quantitative values from qualitative comparisons (Alphonce, 1997; 
Duke & Aull-Hyde, 2002). The ANP method decomposes the decision problem into 
clusters and elements (Alphonce, 1997; Herath, 2004) which are judged qualitatively. 
                                               
1 Attempts to apply output distance function models to these data failed. The reason for that failure 
will be discussed in Section 8. 
The ANP models dependencies both within and between the clusters (inner 
dependence and outer dependence) (Saaty, 1999), allowing calculation of preference 
scores when various clusters are related to each other. Participants answer pairwise 
comparison questions to make the required qualitative judgements. The first set of 
questions concerned pairwise comparisons between elements or clusters, and the 
second set of questions elicited relative importance of elements or clusters in a ratio 
scale. The ratio scales are converted into preference or priority weights by using the 
super matrix technique (Neaupane & Piantanakulchai, 2006). 
7. Data Collection 
7.1 Method 
A survey of 60 community forests from two districts was carried out during March 
and April 2009. Non random purposive sampling was used. CFs were selected to 
represent various forest attributes and community characteristics, such as forest type, 
heterogeneity among FUG members, access to market, area of forests and number of 
households involved. Two questionnaires were used, one for socioeconomic 
information related to the community and the other for ANP. A pre-test of the 
questionnaires checked clarity and item reliability. 
7.2 Study Area 
The study was undertaken in Makawanpur and Kavre Palanchok districts of the 
Middle Hills (MH) of Nepal. The MH region forms the major central belt of Nepal 
and occupies about 30 % of the country. The two districts have similar social, 
cultural and economic characteristics and follow similar forest management
practices. These districts were selected for two main reasons. First, they have a 
history of CF management of more than two decades (Adhikari, 2006; District Forest 
Office, 2008), being pioneer districts for CF (Acharya et al., 2004). Second, the 
principal researcher was involved in various community forestry management 
activities in these two districts, facilitating the field work.
8. Findings and Discussion 
8.1 Production Frontier 
A scatter plot of forest product benefits and environmental performance is shown in 
Figure 3. It was expected the frontier between forest products benefits and 
environmental performance would have a negative slope; however, there is not the 
case for these data. This explains why stochastic output distance functions and DEA 
models were not appropriate and leads to the use of a single output SFM to estimate 
production function.
Figure 3. Forest products benefit and environmental performance 
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In order to estimate the PPF, benefits from forest products per hectare of forest were
used as the dependent variable and various socioeconomic factors and environmental 
condition were used as independent variables (inputs). The Cobb –Douglas 
functional form was used to specify the stochastic PPF (Table 1). 
Table 1. Stochastic PPF: Dependent variable = Benefit per hectare from forest 
products (in Nepalese Rupees )
Variables Coefficient  Standard error t-ratio 
Constant      8.7706*** 0.9110 9.6272
Ln Distance to government office      -0.0733* 0.0429 -1.7070
Ln CF area (ha)    -0.5253*** 0.1172 -4.4840
Forest products sold in market or not      0.4120** 0.1776 2.3196
Ln Heterogeneity of CFUG    -1.1041*** 0.2674 -4.1293
Ln Forest product dependency     0.4084** 0.1598 2.5552
Ln Number of households     0.6713*** 0.1535 4.3743
Ln Environmental performance index 0.4361*** 0.1650 2.6428
Variance parameters for compound error 
/u v   1.4651*** 0.5167 2.8354
2 2
u v    0.7497*** 0.0110 68.1973
Note: ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels 
respectively.  
The stochastic PPF demonstrates that socio economic factors other than traditional 
input factors such as land, labour and capital have contributed significantly to forest 
production.  
The coefficient for distance to the government forest office is negative, but 
significant at the10% level. This result indicates that CF productivity increases the 
closer the CF is to a government office. It is very likely that CFs, which were near to 
the government office, might have better informed regarding forest management 
practices, forest -related rules and regulation. 
CF area has a significant negative impact on forest production. The relationship 
between forest area and per hectare productivity has been widely debated. For 
example, Siry & Newman (2001) have found per hectare a positive relationship
between timber production and forest area in Polish state forests. On the other hand, 
Misra & Kant (2004) have reported a negative association between forest area and 
productivity in India. 
Better CF links to the market positively contribute to forest production. It seems that 
the CFs which have established links to sell forest products in the market were likely 
to produce more forest products than those which did not have a link to a market.
This finding is expected and is consistent with the findings of other studies, such as 
Agrawal & Yadama (1997)) who found that links to markets enhance the harvesting 
of forest products in India.
The inverse relationship of forest production with homogeneity implies that a 
homogenous FUG produces more forest products than a heterogeneous FUG. A
possible reason may be that heterogeneity delays the decision making process 
because of  higher transaction costs in heterogeneous groups (Adhikari & Lovett, 
2006; Misra & Kant, 2005). Misra & Kant (2004) found a negative, but elastic,
relationship between forest product supply and forest user group heterogeneity in 
India and similar results have occurred in other empirical studies (Adhikari & Lovett, 
2006; Gautam, 2007; Varughese & Ostrom, 2001).  
Forest product dependency of FUGs is positively related with CF production. High 
dependency on the CF may indicate that either community FUGs have fewer 
substitutes available, or they have less capacity for using substitutes for forest 
products (Agrawal & Chhatre, 2006; Kant, 2000). Similarly, at the household level in 
Southern Malawi higher dependency on forest products induced more forest products
collection (Fisher, 2004). In contrast, Misra & Kant (2004) have noted that 
dependency of the FUG has no significant contribution to the supply of forest
products in India. Contradictory results may arise because of differences in the roles 
of CFs in Nepal and joint forest management in India, there is more government 
control in decision making in India (Kumar, 2002). Government control over 
harvesting may prevent forest users from collecting forest products according to their 
preferences.
The positive coefficient on number of households in the community indicates that 
bigger communities generate more forest products than smaller communities do.
Misra & Kant (2004) claimed that in community based forest management, each 
household can be considered as a labour input, so they contribute to the production 
process. However, they have pointed out that the role of group size in forest 
production depends on the nature of the group. Groups highly concerned about the 
environment may reduce the production of forest products. On the other hand, a 
medium level or low level of concern with the environment may contribute to higher 
forest production. 
The positive sign on the environmental performance index indicates that forests in 
better environmental condition produce more. This result is similar to what Misra & 
Kant (2004) found in joint forest management in India, where forest production
increases with increase in canopy cover. However, Lichtenstein & Montgomery 
(2003) demonstrated that biodiversity conservation, measured by vertebrate species 
diversity, and timber production are inversely related. They found that within a 
certain range of biodiversity, vertebrate biodiversity could be increased with little 
loss of timber production. However, as biodiversity approached its maximum the 
opportunity cost of conservation increased at an increasing rate. 
8.2 Production Efficiency 
Table 1 estimates for λ (1.4651) and σ (0.7497) are large and significantly different 
from one and zero respectively, indicating that variance associated with inefficiency 
(ui) dominates variance associated with random error (vi). The significant value of λ
identifies inefficiency in the production process (Cooper & Cohn, 1997). 
Production efficiency estimates for individual CFs appear in Appendix1. Production 
efficiency ranges from 0.2942 to 0.8298, with an average efficiency of 0.6281. This 
implies that if the average CF in the sample was to achieve full production 
efficiency, then the average CF could achieve approximately 32% more forest 
products from the same inputs, including environmental condition. The least efficient 
CF could improve production by 64%. 
The distribution of CF production efficiency measures is presented in Table 2. The 
most common decile for production efficiency was 0.70 to 0.80 (26.3% of CFs), 
followed by 0.60 to 0.70 (21.1%). Only 14% of CFs have production efficiency 
greater than 0.80, suggesting that only a small proportion of CFs were operating 
close to the efficiency frontier.  
Table 2. Frequencies of CF production efficiencies 
Efficiency Number of CF Percent
>0.80 8 14.04
0.80-0.70 15 26.32
0.70-0.60 12 21.05
0.60-0.50 10 17.54
0.50-0.40 7 12.28
0.40-0.30 5 8.77
Sample size 57
Mean efficiency 62.81
Minimum 29.42
Maximum 82.98
Various sources of uncertainty, such as sampling error and different sets of 
assumptions made in order to estimate the frontier, make the point estimate uncertain
(Brummer, 2001). Following Bera & Sharma (1999) and Kim & Schmidt (2000),
confidence intervals for production efficiency scores were estimated (Appendix 1). 
Confidence intervals are wide and overlapping (Figure 4). Confidence interval 
bounds for the CF with the highest point estimate of efficiency are 0.5567 and 
0.9941, with width of 0.4374. Likewise, bounds for the CF with the lowest point 
estimate of efficiency are 0.1485 and 0.5826, with width of confidence interval of 
0.4341. CFs which are at the top and bottom ranks, have overlapping confidence 
intervals, so an alternative test of efficiency differences is required. 
Figure 4. 95% confidence intervals for production efficiency 
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A Monte Carlo simulation was carried out to test differences in efficiency between 
each pair of CFs. Efficiency of nineteen CFs was not significantly different from any 
others. However, there was one group of CFs that was more efficient than some other 
CFs and another group that was less efficient than some other CFs. This was the 
basis for classifying efficiency scores into three groups (Appendix 2). CFs 1 to 8 
form the most efficient group, and CFs 51 to 57 are likely to be the least efficient 
CFs. The remainder, CFs 9 to 50, are indeterminate, forming an intermediate group. 
8.3 Factors Explaining Production Efficiency 
Membership of the three groups of CFs identified by the Monte Carlo simulation was 
used as the dependent variable in an ordered logit model which used CF-related 
variables as regressors (Table 3). 
Factors such as time since CF establishment, growing stock of the forest and support 
from government staff, positively contribute to production efficiency. CFs which 
have been established for a long time were more efficient. This may be due to 
managerial skills, which FUG members have learnt over time (Lindara et al., 2006). 
Table 3. Factors explaining production efficiencies
Variable Coefficient  Standard 
Error
t-ratio 
Constant     -5.3842** 2.7194 -1.98
Time since CF establishment(years)   0.1193** 0.0549 2.1708
Social capital index  1.1317* 0.6433 1.7593
Growing stock of CF (m3/ha)    0.0069** 0.0031 2.2411
Support from government staff (yes=1 ,else 0) 1.57*** 0.5069 3.097
Caste heterogeneity in EC -2.0297** 0.9278 -2.1875
Mu( 1)  3.1949*** 0.4997 6.3941
Note: ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels 
respectively.  
CFs which had high social capital were more efficient than CFs with low social 
capital, consistent with the finding by Van Ha et al.(2006) that high levels of social 
capital improved production efficiency of paper recycling households in Vietnam. It 
is possible that social capital reduces transaction costs among FUG members and 
hence helps to enhance efficiency. Likewise, additional support from government 
staff made CFs more efficient. This result is consistent with that obtained by Lindara 
et al.(2006), who found increases in the number of farm visits by extension officers 
decreased inefficiency of Sri Lankan farmers.   
CFs with higher growing stock appear to be more efficient than CFs with lower 
growing stock. High growing stock indicates more forest product availability per unit 
area of forest. 
The coefficient for caste heterogeneity in the FUG executive committee is negative 
and significant. This implies that same-caste executive committees were more 
efficiently than mixed-caste executive committees. One possible reason for the 
negative sign is that heterogeneity affects interactions among executive committee
members, incurring high transaction costs.    
9. Conclusions and Recommendations
The aim of this study was to estimate production efficiency and to indentify the 
factors that influence production efficiency of community forestry in Nepal. The 
result of the analysis demonstrates that factors such as heterogeneity of the FUG, 
dependency of the FUG, environmental performance and other factors affect CF 
production. The stochastic frontier analysis shows that environmental performance 
and CF production are not competing objectives. This association implies there is a 
possibility for augmenting forest product supply along with environmental 
performance of CF.  
Average CF production efficiency is 62.81%, which indicates that there is great 
potential for improvement in production efficiency. The stochastic frontier analysis 
supports the importance of the role of transaction factors, such as heterogeneity and
dependency, in the production process. This study identifies factors such as time 
since establishment of CF, social capital, growing stock and support from 
government staff contributed positively to production efficiency. Some of these items 
provide opportunities for enhancing CF efficiency through government policy 
initiatives. On the other hand, heterogeneity in executive committee members 
decreased production efficiency. However, making an executive committee more 
homogenous is against CF policy, which seeks representation from all social and 
economic groups, so is not an avenue for attaining improvements in efficiency. 
Since this study was carried out in the middle hills of Nepal, results cannot be 
generalised to other parts of Nepal. However, use of the same approach in other parts
of Nepal would be useful for better understanding CF production possibilities. 
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Appendix 1 CF technical efficiency and 95 % conficence intervals
SN Name of CF Technical 
efficiency 
Rank Confidence bound 
(95%)
Interval difference 
(UCB-LCB)
Lower Upper
1 Bageshari 0.7569 13 0.3856 0.9806 0.5950
2 Bajrabarhi 0.6491 28 0.3555 0.9739 0.6183
3 Balkumari 0.6662 27 0.3693 0.9773 0.6080
4 Baluwabharreng 0.6400 30 0.3485 0.9718 0.6233
5 Banaskhandi 0.4896 46 0.2510 0.8936 0.6426
6 Bansgopal 0.5388 43 0.2799 0.9316 0.6518
7 Basuki 0.7693 12 0.4719 0.9902 0.5182
8 Betkholsi 0.8079 5 0.5232 0.9929 0.4697
9 Bhagawan thumki 0.7174 20 0.4153 0.9850 0.5697
10 Bhairabkali 0.7749 11 0.4788 0.9906 0.5118
11 Bhotekhola 0.8021 8 0.5149 0.9925 0.4776
12 Bhutan devi 0.3923 53 0.1986 0.7646 0.5660
13 Bungdal 0.5103 45 0.2629 0.9116 0.6487
14 Chakradevi 0.4700 49 0.2401 0.8735 0.6334
15 Chhanauta 0.4723 48 0.2413 0.8760 0.6347
16 Chhilli bans 0.7362 14 0.4344 0.9871 0.5527
17 Chhitrepani 0.7330 15 0.4311 0.9868 0.5557
18 Chuchekhola 0.8298 1 0.5567 0.9941 0.4374
19 Chulipran 0.8076 6 0.5228 0.9928 0.4701
20 Chunnidevi 0.7285 16 0.4265 0.9863 0.5599
21 Churekalilek 0.7180 19 0.4159 0.9851 0.5692
22 Dangdunage 0.6741 24 0.3759 0.9787 0.6029
23 Dhaneshwar 0.3250 56 0.1641 0.6424 0.4783
24 Dipat 0.5409 42 0.2812 0.9330 0.6518
25 Dovan khola 0.5451 41 0.2837 0.9354 0.6517
26 Ektare 0.3739 54 0.1891 0.7329 0.5438
27 Gosaikunda 0.2942 57 0.1485 0.5826 0.4341
28 Hariyali 0.7190 18 0.4169 0.9852 0.5683
29 Jarungshakti 0.7121 21 0.4102 0.9844 0.5742
30 Jyoti 0.8233 3 0.5464 0.9938 0.4474
31 Kalabanzar 0.6116 35 0.3276 0.9641 0.6365
32 Kalika 0.6418 29 0.3498 0.9722 0.6224
33 Kalika chandika 0.6718 25 0.3739 0.9783 0.6044
34 Kalika hariyali 0.6319 31 0.3424 0.9698 0.6274
35 Kalilek 0.4587 50 0.2339 0.8606 0.6267
36 Kotthumki 0.7810 9 0.4865 0.9911 0.5046
37 Laljhadi 0.5634 39 0.2952 0.9452 0.6500
38 Lother 0.5990 36 0.3188 0.9599 0.6412
39 Mahila srijana 0.7102 22 0.4083 0.9841 0.5758
40 Manakamana (Manahari) 0.3564 55 0.1801 0.7014 0.5213
41 Mangleshar 0.6281 32 0.3395 0.9688 0.6293
42 Mankamana( Gadi) 0.7755 10 0.4795 0.9906 0.5111
43 Namuna 0.7050 23 0.4034 0.9835 0.5800
44 Navalpur sarswati 0.4775 47 0.2443 0.8816 0.6373
45 Newreni chisapani 0.5961 37 0.3167 0.9589 0.6422
46 Parbati mahila 0.6182 33 0.3323 0.9660 0.6338
47 Patleshar 0.5203 44 0.2688 0.9192 0.6505
48 Rani 0.6715 26 0.3737 0.9783 0.6046
49 Resheswar 0.7205 17 0.4184 0.9854 0.5670
50 Saradidevei 0.4421 51 0.2249 0.8396 0.6148
51 Shikaribas 0.8036 7 0.5170 0.9926 0.4756
52 Siddhakali 0.6135 34 0.3289 0.9647 0.6357
53 Simpani devkot 0.4115 52 0.2086 0.7956 0.5870
54 Soltu 0.5566 40 0.2909 0.9418 0.6509
55 Subhlaxmi 0.8241 2 0.5476 0.9938 0.4462
56 Sundar 0.5759 38 0.3033 0.9509 0.6477
57 Thakaldanda 0.8165 4 0.5359 0.9934 0.4575
Notes: LCB= Lower confidence bound, UCB= Upper confidence bound
Appendix 2 Ranking of CFs using Monte Carlo simulation
Name of CF PE Rank Number of CF 
different from
Significantly different from
Chuchekhola 0.8298 1 7 CF57-CF50
Subhlaxmi 0.8241 2 7 CF57-CF50
Jyoti 0.8233 3 6 CF57-CF52
Thakaldanda 0.8165 4 6 CF57-CF52
Betkholsi 0.8079 5 6 CF57-CF52
Chulipran 0.8076 6 6 CF57-CF52
Shikaribas 0.8036 7 6 CF57-CF52
Bhotekhola 0.8021 8 6 CF57-CF52
Kotthumki 0.7810 9 5 CF57-CF53
Mankamana( Gadi) 0.7755 10 5 CF57-CF53
Bhairabkali 0.7749 11 5 CF57-CF53
Basuki 0.7693 12 4 CF57-CF54
Bageshari 0.7569 13 2 CF57-CF56
Chhilli bans 0.7362 14 3 CF57-CF55
Chhitrepani 0.7330 15 3 CF57-CF55
Chunnidevi 0.7285 16 3 CF57-CF55
Resheswar 0.7205 17 2 CF57-CF56
Hariyali 0.7190 18 3 CF57-CF55
Churekalilek 0.7180 19 3 CF57-CF55
Bhagawan thumki 0.7174 20 2 CF57-CF56
Jarungshakti 0.7121 21 2 CF57-CF56
Mahila srijana 0.7102 22 2 CF57-CF56
Namuna 0.7050 23 2 CF57-CF56
Dangdunage 0.6741 24 1 CF57
Kalika chandika 0.6718 25 1 CF57
Rani 0.6715 26 2 CF57-CF56
Balkumari 0.6662 27 1 CF57
Bajrabarhi 0.6491 28 1 CF57
Kalika 0.6418 29 1 CF57
Baluwabharreng 0.6400 30 1 CF57
Kalika hariyali 0.6319 31 1 CF57
Mangleshar 0.6281 32
Parbati mahila 0.6182 33
Siddhakali 0.6135 34
Kalabanzar 0.6116 35
Lother 0.5990 36
Newreni chisapani 0.5961 37
Sundar 0.5759 38
Laljhadi 0.5634 39
Soltu 0.5566 40
Dovan khola 0.5451 41
Dipat 0.5409 42
Bansgopal 0.5388 43
Patleshar 0.5203 44
Bungdal 0.5103 45
Banaskhandi 0.4896 46
Navalpur sarswati 0.4775 47
Chhanauta 0.4723 48
Chakradevi 0.4700 49
Kalilek 0.4587 50
Saradidevei 0.4421 51 4 CF1-CF4
Simpani devkot 0.4115 52 8 CF1-CF8
Bhutan devi 0.3923 53 11 CF1-CF11
Ektare 0.3739 54 12 CF1-CF12
Manakamana(Manahari) 0.3564 55 16 CF14-CF16, CF1-CF13
Dhaneshwar 0.3250 56 24 CF26, C1-CF23
Gosaikunda 0.2942 57 31 CF1-CF27
Note: PE= Production efficiency 
